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3 November 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



[Redacted]

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State Dept. review completed

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DAILY BRIEF

USSR: The renewed attack against the anti-party group at the recently concluded Soviet party congress has aroused more interest among the Soviet people than the new party program, according to Ambassador Thompson. The general reaction of Soviet contacts of the embassy has been that the campaign against the group is a guarantee against the recurrence of terror and for this reason Khrushchev is likely to gain in popular support from it. The ambassador believes that one of Khrushchev's prime motives in stirring up the matter is to justify the Soviet stand vis-a-vis the Chinese and Albanians, and that the action against the anti-party group will serve as a warning to those who might be tempted to go too far in opposing specific policies of Khrushchev.

While Ambassador Thompson believes the party congress has confirmed the broad lines of Khrushchev's foreign policy, he also feels that the party program shows considerable indecision and uncertainty and therefore implies differences of opinion over major internal policies. He states, however, that while it is clear there is strong opposition to individual policies of Khrushchev, he knows of no competent observer in Moscow who considers that there is an organized opposition to Khrushchev's leadership. In Ambassador Thompson's opinion, it appears clear from the composition of the new party central committee and presidium that Khrushchev's position has been greatly strengthened as a result of the congress. [redacted]

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Scandinavia. Commenting on the Soviet note of 30 October to Finland, the acting secretary general of the Finnish Foreign Ministry has stated that Helsinki will not be hasty but cannot refuse to enter into conversations with Moscow within the framework of the "policy of friendliness."

Foreign Minister Lange of Norway is alarmed over the Soviet note, which he feels threatens not only the freedom of Finland but also that of Sweden.

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
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Berlin: The East Germans are not only extending their efforts to control access of Allied personnel in civilian clothing to East Berlin, but also are now attempting to exercise their authority over Western military police patrols in East Berlin. East German police on 31 October and 1 November stopped US army patrols in East Berlin, detained them for periods of an hour or more, and refused requests to summon a Soviet officer.

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France-Algeria:

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negotiations with the French would be resumed between 7 and

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[Redacted]
10 November. The Moslem demonstrations on 1 November throughout Algeria, although resulting in Moslem deaths which the rebel government has protested, are not expected to prevent resumption of negotiations. [Redacted] The anti-De Gaulle Secret Army Organization can be expected to attempt to provoke new violence in an effort to prevent a negotiated settlement. [Redacted] Page 3)

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Views of Scandinavian Officials on Soviet Note to Finland

The Finnish response will be determined only after the return of President Kekkonen from Hawaii on 3 November. The view seems to be widespread in Finland, however, that talks with the Soviet Union are inevitable. Foreign Minister Karjalainen, en route home from his American visit, told Danish Foreign Minister Krag on 1 November that "if the Soviets want to talk, we'll talk."

Krag told the American ambassador that the Soviet note would not cause Denmark to change its affirmative attitude toward plans for a unified NATO command for the Baltic in which West Germany would have a major role. Concern over the Soviet note could, however, provide the Danish Government with a reason for further procrastination on final agreement on these Baltic defense plans.

A high Finnish Foreign Ministry official in talking with the American ambassador observed that the Soviet note concentrated its attack on Germany and contained no strictures against Finland or its government, and that therefore he does not believe the Soviet Union contemplates demanding extensive military concessions from Finland. He likewise argues that Finnish agreement to consult does not constitute automatic acceptance of the contentions in the Soviet note and that the Finns will insist that the security of the Soviet Union is not threatened through Finland.

In a conversation with US officials on 1 November, Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange said he felt this latest Soviet move could mean "the beginning of a take-over of Finland." He also maintained that the threat to Sweden was obvious and implied that the fact that Sweden was outside NATO should not interfere with the Western countries' very deep concern for the "continuance of the freedom of Sweden." In a public statement Lange claimed that it now is more important than ever that his planned visit to the Soviet Union later this month take place as scheduled in order to clear up the misunderstanding about Norway's position evinced in

the Soviet note. At the periodic meeting of the Scandinavian prime ministers in Finland on 11-12 November, officials of these countries will have an opportunity for a first-hand exchange of views on the problems created by the Soviet note.

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Prospects for Resumption of French Algerian Negotiations

[Dahlab stated in an interview published this week in Afrique Action, the paper of Bourguiba's Neo-Destour party, that the provisional Algerian government (PAG) realized that an independent Algerian government must cooperate with others, particularly France.]

One factor in the absence of Moslem-European clashes appears to have been the determination of the French forces to keep the two communities separated, but both sides reportedly had been ordered to avoid armed violence. A section leader of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) stated on the evening of 31 October that, although arms and grenades had been issued to his men, he had no orders to initiate an attack. A rebel section leader reportedly said that his orders were to demonstrate, but not to initiate violence.

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[The OAS remains a strong threat to French control in Algeria, despite recently intensified efforts to cripple it.]

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[inefficiency and lack of understanding of how to combat subversion have hampered French efforts to capture the OAS leaders.] many French officials involved in these efforts seem merely to be going through the motions for fear of OAS assassination squads. [although the OAS does not yet appear to be willing to attempt to take power, it is able to operate almost at will.]

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The OAS is capable of confronting De Gaulle with another crisis. It is not clear whether the army generally would support the government in such an event, but at least some high-ranking officers would almost certainly attempt to use their units in support of the OAS. []

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